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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
TRAVELERS/AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20000227 CA

vs.
KEITH WILSON AND TRISHA WILSON,

Defendants/Appellants.
KEITH WILSON AND CARLENE WILSON,
GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR TRISHA WILSON,
A MINOR,

Counter Plaintiffs,
vs.
TRAVELERS/AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY,

Counter Defendant.

JURISDICTION

Defendant appealsfromSummary Judgment within this Court's jurisdiction, having been
transferred to this court under Utah Code Annotated. § 78-2-2(4) on May 11, 2000.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Issue 1:

Did the trial court err in applying New York law to grant summary

judgment to Travelers/Aetna Insurance Company ("Travelers") and to deny summary
judgment in favor of Keith Wilson and Trisha Wilson ("the Wilsons") when under
conflict of law rules, Utah law should have been applied.

1

Standard of Review: Conflict of law questions are legal conclusions. Shaw v.
Layton Constr. Co.. 872 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness. See
SS. v. State. 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1256
(Utah 1998); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Costr.. 977 P.2d 518,
522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). This standard of review has also been referred to as a
"correction of error standard." Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 839 P.2d 789,
790 (Utah 1992); Sanders v. Ovard. 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 1992); Commercial
Union Assocs. v. Clayton. 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). As used by Utah's
appellate court's "correctness" means that no particular deference is given to the trial
court's ruling on questions of law. See Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah
1998); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d at 936; Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs.r Inc. 970 P.2d 277,
280 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Questions of common law interpretation are questions of law, and thus the
appellate court gives no deference to the lower court. See Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d
777,778-9 (Utah 1992); State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Interpretation of the effect of a prior judicial decision is a question of law. State v.
Montoya. 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994).
Whether Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law. Tallman.
370 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31: Crerhich v. Numed. Inc.. 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999);
Coulter & Smith v. Russell. 976 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Winters v.
2

Shulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Issue 2:

Did the trial court err in deciding that Utah law, if applied to the

facts of this case, does not bar Travelers from denying underinsured motorist coverage
under Keith Wilson's personal automobile policy based on a claim that the benefits of
another insurance policy paid in this case were primary and offset any obligation of
Travelers to pay out benefits.
Standard of Review:

The trial courts interpretation of statutes, rules

and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Seer e.g. Rushton v. Salt
Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel CT. v, Johnson, 977 P.2d
479, 480 (Utah 1999); Loporto v. Hoegemann. 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App.
1999) (judicial code); A.K. &R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const.. 977 P.2d
518, 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (contractor licensing).
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See

Slisze v, Stanley-BostUtch, 979 P.2d 317,319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's placement is
question of law reviewed for correctness).
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness. See
S.S. v. State. 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1256
(Utah 1998); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Costr.. 977 P.2d 518,
522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). This standard of review has also been referred to as a
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"correction of error standard." Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 789,
790 (Utah 1992V Sanders v. Ovard. 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 1992); Commercial
Union Assocs. v. Clayton. 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). As used by Utah's
appellate court's "correctness" means that no particular deference is given to the trial
court's ruling on questions of law. See Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah
1998); Pena, 869 P.2d at 936; Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs.. Inc. 970 P.2d 277, 280
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law. Tallman. 370 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 31; Gerbich v. Numedr Inc.. 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999); Coulter &
Smith v. Ruseell. 976 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Winters v. Shulman. 977
P.2d 1218, 1221 (UtahCt. App. 1999).
Issue 3:

Did the trial court err when it refused to grant the motion to amend

pleadings filed by Wilsons even though Travelers could not demonstrate prejudice in the
event the motion to amend were granted.
Standard of Review:

The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules

and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Seer e.g. Rushton v. Salt
Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. CT. v. Johnson. 977 P.2d
479, 480 (Utah 1999); Loporto v. Hoegemann. 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App.
1999) (judicial code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const. 977 P.2d
518, 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
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Whether a statute [or rule] applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law.
See Sliszev.Stanley-Bostlitch. 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State y, Burgess, 870
P.2d 276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
STATUTES/RULES

UCA § 31A-22-305(10)(d)(i)(B), (iv), and (v)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 13(e)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Case.
This declaratory relief action filed in the trial court by Traveler's Insurance Co.

("Travelers") and the Counter Complaint for declaratory relief filed by the appellants,
Keith and Tricia Wilson ("the Wilsons") both request the court to determine whether
coverage for personal injuries sustained by the Wilsons in an automobile accident should
be covered by the policy of insurance issued to Keith Wilson.

2.

Course of Proceedings.
Each party brought a Motion for Summary Judgment against the other. Appellants

also brought a Motion to Amend Pleadings. The court granted Appellee's Motion for
5

Summary Judgment and denied both of Appellant's motions. Appellant now appeals the
court's orders as to all three motions.

1

Statement of Facts,
On or about May 1, 1996, Keith Wilson had accepted a job for a Salt Lake City

trucking company as a driver in anticipation of a move to Utah with his family. See
Affidavit of Keith Wilson, attached hereto as Addendum "B", paragraph 8. On May 8,
1996, Keith Wilson and his family had moved out of their home in New York into Keith
Wilson's parent's home. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 9. Keith Wilson and
his family had sold their furniture before May 8, 1996 in preparation to move to Utah.
See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 10. Most of their remaining personal property,
other than some small items, had been placed in a storage unit pending their move to
Utah. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 10. Keith Wilson and his eldest daughter
Trisha Wilson left Keith's parents' home in Silver Creek, New York for Utah on June 30,
1996. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 11.
Prior to leaving New York on June 30, 1996, Keith Wilson had called his friend in
Salt Lake City to request assistance in locating an apartment in Salt Lake City. See
Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 12. Prior to June 30, 1996, Keith Wilson had called
the Granite School District in Salt Lake County, Utah to request information about
enrolling his children in school. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 13.
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Prior to June 30, 1996, Keith Wilson told his insurance agency that he had
purchased a van so that he could move his family from New York to Utah. See Affidavit
of Keith Wilson paragraph 14. Prior to June 30, 1996 Keith Wilson had substituted a
1993 Plymouth Voyager as the automobile listed on the insurance policy in place of a
1987 Ford Taurus wagon which was listed previously. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson
paragraph 15. Keith Wilson told employees at his insurance agency that he was moving
to the State of Utah before he renewed the insurance policy with them. See Affidavit of
Keith Wilson paragraph 16.
Prior to leaving New York, on June 30, 1996, Keith had requested that his
dispatcher route him through Salt Lake City, UT where Keith and Trisha Wilson planned
to rent an apartment for the family. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 18. When
leaving New York on June 30, 1996, Keith and Trisha Wilson took all of their personal
belongings which they would need during the summer as well as a couple of additional
bags of clothing and miscellaneous items to move to Utah. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson
paragraph 19.
When Keith and Trisha Wilson left New York on or about June 30, 1996, they had
no plans to return to New York. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 20. Keith
Wilson changed his log book to Utah time and ran his clock by Utah time. See Affidavit
of Keith Wilson paragraph 20. It was the custom of Keith Wilson and drivers in the
industry in general to keep their log based on the time of the dispatch center closest to his
home. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson, paragraph 21. The Wilsons traveled to Salt Lake
7

City arriving on the evening of July 18, 1996. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph
25. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 26. The Wilsons spent approximately two
days in Salt Lake County looking for an apartment. Keith Wilson submitted between two
to six rental applications for apartments in Salt Lake County. See Affidavit of Keith
Wilson paragraph 26.
As of July 18, 1996, Keith and Trisha Wilson were present in Salt Lake County,
Utah with an intention to make Salt Lake County their permanent home. See Affidavit of
Keith Wilson paragraph 27. It is undisputed that the Wilsons, while passenger's in an
automobile, sustained serious injuries due to an accident in the state of Utah. See
Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraphs 1-3. It is also undisputed that Keith Wilson's
automobile insurance policy was in effect at the time of the underlying accident. See
Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 24.
Following the accident, the Wilsons received treatment in Salt Lake City hospitals.
See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 31. Keith Wilson was released from the
hospital on August 4, 1996. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 31. In this case,
the Wilsons incurred medical bills in a total amount of over $100,000.00. Keith
Wilson, has not returned to work due to head trauma from the accident. See Affidavit
of Keith Wilson paragraph 3. The Wilsons are residents of Utah. See Affidavit of Keith
Wilson paragraph 37. The children attend school in Salt Lake County, Utah. See
Affidavit of Keith Wilson. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 38.
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SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT

Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it refused to apply Utah law to
interpret Keith Wilson's contract of insurance. Under Utah's conflict of law rules, the
court used the balancing test to determine which state had "the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties" pursuant to Section 188 of Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws. Although appellants agree that Section 188 of the
Restatement is the appropriate conflict of law test, the court misapplied the test to the
facts of this case. The only relationship New York had to the parties at the time of the
accident or to the accident was that the policy of insurance had been negotiated and
issued in the State of New York. However, the insurance policy had been renewed by
Travelers after the Wilsons had permanently left New York. Even though New York may
have had minimal contacts under the test, Utah, by far, has the most significant
relationship with the accident which involved its own residents on its own soil.
Utah had the most significant relation to the accident in this case. The Wilson's
were residents of the state of Utah at the time of the accident because they were present
in the state of Utah with the intention to reside here. They had left the state of New York
together several weeks earlier. Neither Keith nor Tricia Wilson had any intention of
returning to reside New York at the time they left New York. This intention was
manifest by the circumstances of the move.
There is no dispute that the location of the accident and almost all of the treatment
for the injuries was in the state of Utah. Appellants contend that the court should have
9

found that the Wilsons were residents of the state of Utah at the time of the accident and
that under the conflict of law rules Utah law should apply to the interpretation of the
Wilsons insurance contract. Utah law does not permit the offset against other insurance
coverages under the facts of this case. Because the court applied New York law,
Appellants have been deprived of total insurance benefits between the two of them of
$50,000.00. Under Utah statutes and conflict of laws rules this decision should be
reversed.
ARGUMENT

Issue 1:

Did the trial court err in applying New York law to grant summary

judgment to Travelers/Aetna Insurance Company ("Travelers") and to deny summary
judgment in favor of Keith Wilson and Trisha Wilson ("the Wilsons") when under
conflict of law rules, Utah law should have been applied.
1.

Summary Judgment.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) permits the court to grant summary

judgment if "there is no genuine issue or any material facts and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c). In
the present case, there is no genuine issue as to the Appellants' statement of undisputed
material facts, summarized above in the Statement of Facts.
2.

Utah law should apply in this case.
In this case there were undersinsured motorist benefits available to the Wilsons
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under both the drivers' policy and under Keith Wilson's personal policy. Neither policy
is sufficient to cover the damages of the Wilsons. New York law does not allow the
Wilsons to add the benefits of the two policies together to obtain benefits above a total of
$25,000.00. See NYSCC § 60-2.1 (C). However, Utah law does allow the parties to
receive full benefits from each of the policy with no cap or offset. See UCA § 31A-22305(10)(d).
Because there is a conflict in the application of the two laws of two states with
some connection to the parties, the initial question is a conflict of laws question. See
American National Fire Insurance Co.. v. Farmers Insurance. 927 P.2d 186, (Utah 1996).
American National Fire also involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of a policy of
insurance based on the conflicting law of two states. The court in that case held that Utah
conflict of law rules require that the court adopt the balancing test in Restatement of
Conflicts §188 to determine which state has the "most significant interest in the parties
and the accident." Restatement of Conflicts § 188(2) was quoted by the court as follows:
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. . ., the
contacts to be taken into account in .. . [determining] the law applicable to
an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance of the contract,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
11

(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §
188(2).
Each of these factors will be discussed in turn to show that although New York had had a
much more significant relationship to the parties a couple of months before the accident,
New York had very little relationship to the parties or the accident at the time of the
events involved in this case,
a.

Restatement of Conflicts §188(2)(a) and (b).
In the case of automobile insurance contracts, the place of negotiation and

contracting is much less related to the interests of a forum in the parties and in the
coverage of insurance than other types of contracts. In this mobile society, people move
and change residences frequently without having the insurance company change their
insurance policy. In fact Travelers knew for sure that the Wilsons had moved to the state
of Utah when Travelers began corresponding with the Wilsons in Utah regarding PIP
(personal injury protection benefits). Yet, even then, Travelers did not require Keith
Wilson to request any amendment to his automobile insurance policy.
Although Keith Wilson negotiated his policy of insurance in the state of New York
and the policy and renewal papers were signed in the state of New York, at the time of
the accident in this case New York had lost all connection with the Wilsons.
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Keith Wilson was neither present in nor a domicile of New York at the time the
renewal of his SUM (Supplemental uninsured motorist) benefits (which also provided
underinsured motorist benefits) came in to effect, on July 5, 1996.
Further, Keith Wilson had told his insurance agency in New York that he was
planning a move to Utah. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 16. Keith Wilson
told his insurance agency that he was substituting the insured vehicle on his policy
because he had purchased a van for the purpose of moving his family' things to Utah.
See Affidavit of Keith Wilson paragraph 15. The company was on notice that Keith
Wilson's policy was to cover him in Utah where he intended to be for the policy term.
Keith Wilson left New York for Utah as planned. Yet he was never requested to amend
his policy, his premium or to obtain a replacement policy. See Affidavit of Keith Wilson
paragraph 36.
b.

Restatement of Conflicts § 188(2)(c).
The principal place interested in performance of the automobile insurance contract

in this case was the State of Utah. The Wilsons had already made their payment of the
insurance premium. That premium may have had a connection with New York.
However, once the premium was paid, the executory performance of the contract was the
place where the benefits would be paid.

13

The injured parties were in Utah. The state that needed to collect money to pay its
health care professionals and facilities was in the state of Utah. The place that needed to
provide shelter for the Wilsons and make sure that the Wilsons had the necessities of life
paid from the policy was the state of Utah.
c.

Restatement of Conflicts § 188(2)(d).
In this case, the insured risk was located in Salt Lake City, Utah. Keith and Trisha

Wilson were in Salt Lake County to stay. Any risk of loss due to personal injury to them
was principally in Salt Lake County where Keith Wilson had chosen to live during the
policy term.
The insured vehicle of the Wilsons still remained garaged in New York at the time
of the accident because the Wilsons had come to Salt Lake ahead of the rest of the family
and the larger possessions. However, the insured vehicle was not involved in the
accident. The insured risk in this accident was the likelihood of personal injury to the
Wilsons in Utah.
d.

Restatement ofConflicts§ 188(2)(e).
"Domicile" is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as "physical presence within a

state and the intention to make it one's home. Montoya v. Collier. 85 N.M. 356, 512
P.2d 684, 686." Black's Law Dictionary, sixth edition, p.484. Intent is the factor which
changes mer presence into residence.

14

On July 2 1 , 1996, the date of the accident, the domicile and residence of Keith
and Trisha Wilson was in Salt Lake City, Utah. On that date each was present in Salt
Lake City at that time with the intention to live in Salt Lake County, Utah from that time
forward. Although the Wilsons did not yet have a residence address in Salt Lake County,
Keith Wilson had submitted several applications to rent an apartment in Salt Lake County
for his family.
Keith Wilson and Trisha Wilson were present in Salt Lake City at the time of the
accident because they had the intention at that time to make Salt Lake City their home
and they were acting on that intention. They had spent over three months prior to the
accident preparing to leave New York and to move to Utah. These preparations included
major life changes: Keith Wilson obtained employment with a Utah company. The
family had moved out of their prior horn and sold most of their furniture. The family
purchased a van to move them across the country. The Wilsons had left the rest of the
family with a plan in place to move to Utah.
The Wilsons had not only formed the intention to leave New York at the time of
the accident, they had abandoned New York as a domicile and moved to Utah. Keith

15

Wilson had no plans to return to New York after July 5, 1996. Keith Wilson had changed
his log books to Salt Lake time. Keith Wilson's stated intention was to make Salt Lake
his home and to keep his daughter Tricia with him until they met the rest of the family to
help them move to Salt Lake City.
The Wilsons deliberately came to Utah to establish residence here. As indicated
in the copy of the Affidavit of Vicki Bannor, originally attached to the Wilsons'
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum
"C", on the date of the accident Keith Wilson and his family had been approved for an
apartment at 1992 Fairwood Dr. Apt. 10, Salt Lake City, Ut. This apartment was held for
them even though the Wilson family was not able to move in when scheduled. The
Wilsons moved into the apartment at 1992 Fairwood Dr. Apt. 10, Salt Lake City, Ut
about 3lA months after the accident.
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the Wilsons were residents of the state
of Utah at the time of the accident. Although the Wilsons did not have a Utah address,
they were working towards establishing an address when they were injured in the
accident.
The primary factors in this case should be where the parties were
domiciled, where the contract would be performed, and where the insureds were (the cite
of the accident). The real affects of the accident were in Utah. Utah is where the
Wilsons were hospitalized and Utah is the state where the Wilsons continue to reside.
Utah has to help the Wilsons through their health andfinancialchallenges caused by the
16

accident. Because the accident was in Utah and the Wilsons were residents of Utah, Utah
had the most significant relationship with the parties and the accident at the time of the
accident. Therefore, this court should overturn thefindingsof the trial court to the
contrary.
Issue 2:

Did the trial court err in deciding that Utah law, if applied to the

facts of this case, does not bar Travelers from denying underinsured motorist coverage
under Keith Wilson's personal automobile policy based on a claim that the benefits of
another insurance policy paid in this case were primary and offset any obligation of
Travelers to pay out benefits.
JL

Contracts are to be Interpreted Pursuant to Applicable State Law t
The conflict of law rule under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(1)

has been adopted by Utah. That section requires that the
"rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties and
the principles stated in § 6." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §
188(1).
Because the state of Utah has the "most significant relationship" to the parties and
the accident in this case, Utah law determines the rights and duties of the parties under
Kieth Wilsons automobile insurance policy. New York law requires set off of
underinsured motorist benefits. However, Utah law requires stacking of those benefits
17

under the facts of this case.
Utah law requires that if the occupant of a vehicle who is not an insured or related
to the insured of that vehicle is injured, the underinsured motorist benefits under the
policy for that vehicle must be stacked with, or added to, the insurance benefits available
to the occupant under his own policy. SeeUCA § 31A-22-305(10)(d). UCA§31A-22305(10)(d) states as follows:
"(i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured motorist
coverage benefits under any policy in which they are described as a
"covered person" as defined under Subsection (1): . . .
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a
motor vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for
the regular use of the covered person, the covered person's
resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative...
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the
covered person is occupying.
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against
the other." Id.
Because the Wilsons were injured while occupying a vehicle owned by a
nonrelative, the underinsured benefits of Keith Wilson's personal policy must be stacked
on top of and not set off against the underinsured benefits of the vehicle the Wilsons were
occupying at the time of the accident. Therefore, Travelers cannot deny the Wilsons
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insurance benefits under the offset provision provided under New York law.
2. Applicable Conflicts of Law Test
In Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp.. 348 U.S. 66, 75 S.Ct 166, 99
L.Ed. 74 (1954), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an approach to a choice of law question
involving an insurance contract which was similar to the analysis in Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(1). In Watson, cited the following dicta from
previous decisions: "[T]here might be future cases in which the terms of out-of-state
contracts would be so repugnant to the vital interests of the forum state as to justify
nonenforcement." M. at p. 71.
The court went on to describe the interests of the forum state in Watson:
"Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be
Louisiana residents and even if not, Louisiana may have to
care for them. Serious injuries may require treatment in
Louisiana homes or hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The
injured may be destitute. They may be compelled to call
upon friends, relatives, or the public for help. Louisiana has
manifested its natural interests in injured by providing
remedies for recovery of damages. It has a similar interest in
policies of insurance which are designed to assure ultimate
payment of such damages." Id. at p. 72.
The court continues, "where, as here, a contract affects the people of several states
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each may have interests that leave it free to enforce its own contract policy . . . plainly
[the interests of the state where the contract was delivered] cannot outweigh the interests
of Louisiana in taking care of those injured in Louisiana." Id. at p. 73. In Watson the
injury arose out of use of a home permanent solution. In this case, the reckless driving of
a Utah resident caused injury to persons in two vehicles including the death of the driver
of the vehicle in which the WILSONS were passengers.
In American National Fire Insurance v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 927 P2d.
186, 189, (Utah 1986), the Utah supreme court distinguished Watson. However, in
American National Fire, the out of state driver was merely passing through Utah and the
litigants were two insurance companies appealing from a decision in a subrogation action.
In American National Fire. Farmers Insurance Company had a primary $500,000.00
policy. American National Fire Insurance Company had a secondary policy which would
pay up to $250,000.00.
The equities involved in Watson relating to adequate insurance protection for
injured parties was not an issue in American National Fire. However, all of the equitable
concerns cited above in Watson are at the heart of the present case. In the present case,
adequacy of insurance is the issue. The issue of which state's law applies will determine
whether the Wilson will get the benefit of the $50,000.00 of underinsured motorist
benefits under Keith Wilson's Aetna policy over and above the wholly inadequate
benefits of other underinsured benefits from the other policies of insurance available for
the accident, or whether this recovery is barred by New York law. Utah's public policy
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requires that the insurance benefits be paid to the Wilsons under these facts.
Under the conflict of laws rules adopted by Utah, the court can interpret the
insurance contract in light of Utah law to bar the setoff provisions which woudl be
permitted under New York law in this case. Utah's relationship to the parties and the
accident and Utah's public policy favoring payment of the insurance benefits of Keith
Wilson's policy in this case give the court a sound basis for interpreting the Traveler's
policy in light of the stacking requirements of Utah law.

Issue 3:

Did the trial court err when it refused to grant the motion to amend

pleadings filed by Wilsons even though Travelers could not demonstrate prejudice if the
motion to amend were granted.
2 Request to Amend Answer
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) requires that Defendants seek leave of
court to amend its Answer at any time after twenty days from service. Because more than
twenty days passed since service, Defendants sought leave of court to file it's Amended
Answer. The court's denial of this request was in error.
Defendant's previous Answer contained many errors which were not discovered
by counsel until the depositions of the Defendants on November 20, 1998. The
deposition testimony of the Defendants in regards to the residence of the parties on July
5, 1996 and July 21, 1996 was contrary to the Answer. In order to correct these errors
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and clerical errors in the Answer, Defendants made a request for leave to file their
Amended Answer correcting errors were included in the Answer because of inadvertence
on the part of Defendants' attorney.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) provides "leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires." In this case, justice requires that Defendants' position be
accurately stated in the Answer. Further, there would be no prejudice to the Plaintiff by
allowing these amendments.
Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer was a technical motion to clarify two
paragraphs of the answer which were inconsistent and to amend the answer to conform to
the facts which were clarified through discovery.
Plaintiffs have always been on notice that the Wilsons claimed that in early July
they were moving to Utah. See paragraph 3 of Defendant's Answer to Complaint.
Defendant's attorney inadvertently answered in paragraph 26 to the Complaint that
residence in New York at the time of the accident was admitted even though this
paragraph of the answer was contrary to the Defendant's answer in paragraph 3 of the
Complaint. Defendants brought this motion to clarify the record.
This mistake was clerical in nature and made inadvertently. Defendants did not
read the Answer or verify it. Neither party disputes that the Wilsons were actually
traveling to Utah on July 5, 1996. The termination of residence is really a legal question
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based on many factors including where the Wilsons were present and what was their
intention. The Wilsons were not present in New York. The Wilsons had intended to
make Utah their residence since at least May of 1996.
a.

Plaintiff has failed to state any prejudice.
Correcting these mistakes would not prejudice the Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs

have been on notice from the answer to paragraph 3 of the Complaint that Defendant's
were moving to Utah during the first part of July 1996, suggesting a change of residence.
In paragraph 19 (f) and 19 (g) of Defendant's affirmative defenses in their answer,
Defendants disclosed that they had decided to move to Utah prior to the accident and that
Defendant's were obtaining new housing for the family in Utah in July, 1996. In the
deposition of Keith Wilson, which was taken over fifteen months after Defendants'
answer to the complaint, Plaintiffs attorney spent more than half of the deposition
asking questions about Defendant's residence at the time of the accident. If Plaintiff
relied so heavily on the admission as to paragraph 26 of the complaint as to Defendant's
residence, there would have been no reason for the Plaintiff to have taken so much effort
in the Wilsons' depositions to explore the issue of residency.
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b.

Timeliness of Motion to Amend Answer
The Defendants Motion to Amend their answer was brought as soon as their

attorney realized that he had mistakenly admitted paragraph 26 of the Complaint. This
motion for a correction came before either party filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. Motion to amend counter complaint to add cause of Action for Breach of Contract
On or about August 25, 1997, Counter Plaintiffs filed an Answer to the declaratory
relief action and filed a Counter Complaint alleging personal injuries which had not been
adequately compensated by other available insurance as well as the existence of
underinsured motorist coverage under Keith Wilson's own insurance policy.
However, in the counter complaint, counter plaintiffs inadvertently failed to
request relief for counter defendant's breach of contract and to request an award for
damages under the policy.
Counter plaintiffs alleged in their counter complaint that they were entitled to
benefits under the policy with the counter defendants. However, counter plaintiffs
neglected to pray for relief for breach of contract under that policy. Counter plaintiffs
requested leave to file their Amended Counter Complaint which was denied.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 13(e) allowed a party to set up a counter claim
which was omitted due to "oversight, inadvertence or excusable neglect, or as justice
requires". In this case, the facts underlying in the cause of action were alleged
sufficiently to put counter defendant on notice of plaintiff s claim under the policy.
There would be no prejudice to the counter plaintiff by a request for breach of contract.
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Further, it would be in the interest of justice that this court hear this entire case at
one time. The reason for this counter complaint is to enforce the insurance contract.
Allowing the requested amendment to the Counter Complaint clarifies the relief sought.
Counter plaintifFs could file a separate lawsuit for enforcement of the contract. However,
judicial economy requires that if a second lawsuit were filed it should be consolidated
into the current lawsuit.
Because this matter is pending before the court and any action filed by the counter
plaintiffs to recover damages against Aetna Insurance company would necessarily be
consolidated into this action to be heard by the same judge, counter plaintiffs move this
court to allow amendment to the counter complaint expressly request to the court
determine the amount of damages to which the Counter Plaintiffs are entitled under the
contract with Aetna.
Conclusion
Defendants and counter plaintiffs request that this court apply Utah law to require
coverage by Travellers to the extent of the damages of the Wilsons under the Travelers
policy without set off, because Utah statute and public policy require coverage under
these facts and Utah is the state which has born the bulk of the loss of the accident and
was the residence of the Wilsons at the time of the accident, and to grant them leave to
file their Amended Answer and Amended Counter Complaint.
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DATED this

^

day of November 2001.

Steve S. Chfistensen
Attorney for Defendants/Counter
Plaintiffs/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that an copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed
first class, postage prepaid on the

^

day of November 2001 to:

Terry M. Plant
Justin Hitt
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Addendum A
STATUTES/RULES

UCA § 31A-22-305(10)(d)(i)(B), (iv), and (v)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 13(e)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c)
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The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000,
added "at the time of the proposed exclusion" at
the beginning of Subsection (7)(a), added Sub-

31A-22-305

sections (7)(b) and (7Xc), and made related
changes

31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption,
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the
policy or owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not
covered under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing
occurrence; or
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required
by Section 31A-22-304;
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent of the deficiency;
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately
caused by the vehicle operator;
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is
disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with
the effective date of this act, continues to be disputed for more than 60
days; or
(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability
insurer of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent
jurisdiction;
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to
the extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by
a guaranty association or fund.
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b)
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured
motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's
motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser
amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and
(hi) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of
the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum unin-
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sured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are
less than the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability
policies under Section 31A-22-304.
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that
issuer of the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing,
requests different uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer.
(e) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall
disclose in the same medium as the premium renewal notice, an
explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage and the
costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and
including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured
motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor
vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor
vehicle policy.
(4) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the
insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22302(l)(a).
(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage.
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage
until the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage
from that liability insurer.
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in
the business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural
persons by motor vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their students, shall provide coverage for all
vehicles used for that purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or
by self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at least $25,000 per
person and $500,000 per accident.
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an
injured covered person.
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage:
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2,
Workers' Compensation Act;
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers'
Compensation insurance; and
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the
covered person has been made whole.
(d) As used in this Subsection (4):
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section
63-30-2.
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la102.
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(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under
Subsection (2Kb) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must
show the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing
evidence consisting of more than the covered person's testimony.
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person
for any one accident.
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person
as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii).
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is
entitled to the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded
for any one vehicle that the covered person is the named insured or an
insured family member.
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle
the covered person is occupying.
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off
against the other.
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall
be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or
using a motor vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or
replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as
provided in Subsection (6) or (7), a covered person injured in a vehicle
described in a policy that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not
elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor
vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered person.
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist
benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered
person" as defined in Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor
vehicle; and
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor
vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use
of the covered person, the covered person's resident spouse, or the
covered person's resident relative.
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a
vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a
liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has
insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all
special and general damages.
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include:
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the
same policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2).
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(c)
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover
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damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of
the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a
lesser amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the
insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase
underinsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the
limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer
under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are
less than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000
for two or more persons in any one accident.
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that
issuer of the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing,
requests different underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer.
(e) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described
in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8).
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability
coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but
shall be added to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the
limit of coverage available to the injured person.
(f) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by
an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage
under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a).
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer
that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured
motorist coverage and when it would be applicable.
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage
until the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage
from that liability insurer.
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall
disclose in the same medium as the premium renewal notice, an
explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and the
costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and
including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry
underinsured motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the
insured's motor vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under
the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using
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a motor vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the
insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the
motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if
the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered
under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in this Subsection (10),
a covered person injured in a vehicle described m a policy t h a t includes
underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect underinsured
motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy
under which he is a named insured.
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two
or more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or
stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an
injured person for anj^ one accident.
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered
person as defined under Subsection (10)(d)d)(B).
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident
shall be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person
described under Subsections (L)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage:
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2,
Workers' Compensation Act;
(ii) may not be subrograted by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers'
Compensation insurance; and
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the
covered person has been made whole.
(d) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured
motorist coverage benefits under any other policy in which they are
described as a "covered person" as defined under Subsection (1):
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an
underinsured motor vehicle; or
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor
vehicle t h a t is not owned by, furnished, or available for the
regular use of the covered person, the covered person's resident
spouse, or the covered person's resident relative.
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of
coverage.
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(d)(i)(B) is
entitled to the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage
afforded for any one vehicle t h a t the covered person is the named
insured or an insured family member.
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle
the covered person is occupying.
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off
against the other
(e) A covered injured person is not barred against making subsequent
elections if r e c o v e r is unavailable under previous elections.
(11) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle
underinsured motorist policy more t h a n three years after the date of the last
liability policy payment.
(12) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified by
the department t h a t all liability insurers have tendered their liability
policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either:

78-2-1.5
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78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 78-2-1 5 (L 1969, ch
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch 182,
§ 4

Section 78-2-1 6 (L 1979, ch 134, § 1, 1981,
ch 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices,
was repealed by Laws 1981, ch 267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree
or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
8
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that issue, or the plaintiff is otherwise given
notice and an opportunity to meet the issue.
Olpin v. Grove Fin. Co., 521 P.2d 1221 (Utah
1974).
—Mutual m i s t a k e .
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as
it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima
facie case, and the failure to assert it is a
waiver of t h a t defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson
Constr. Co., 682 R2d 287 (Utah 1984).
— S t a t u t e of frauds.
The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the pleadings,
else it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666
R2d 876 (Utah 1983).
— S t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s .
In an action by water user challenging
charges of water district, plaintiff waived thirty-day limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by
failing to plead it in answer to defendant's
counterclaim. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13
Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962).
The statute of limitations defense must be
pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or it is waived, unless an
amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed p u r s u a n t to the requirements of Rule
15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation C o , 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Keller v.
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102
(Utah 1998).
—Waiver.
Where plaintiff sought to rescind a contract
to purchase a business from defendant on
ground that the agreement was procured by
fraud, and defendant claimed that any fraud
had been waived by plaintiff's continued oper-

Rule 13

ation of the business, the allegation of waiver
was an affirmative defense which should have
been pleaded, and failure to do so constituted a
waiver of the defense under this rule. Bezner v.
Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898
(Utah 1976).
Cited in Farrell v. Mennen C o , 120 Utah
377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Ibwn of
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P 2 d 216
(1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d
57, 305 R2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P.2d 924
(1968); Manger v. Davis, 619 R2d 687 (Utah
1980); P r a t t v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah
1981); Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah
1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694 R2d 612
(Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P 2 d 311 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust C o ,
754 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Arrow I n d u s , Inc. v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah
1988); Lowe v. Sorenson Research C o , 779 P.2d
668 (Utah 1989); Weber v. Snyderville West,
800 P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied,
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); Moffitt v. Barr, 837
P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry v. Valley
Mtg. C o , 835 P.2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993); Richards Irrigation Co. v.
Karren, 880 R2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cruz v.
Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d
1252 (Utah 1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek
Plaza, 923 R2d 1389 (Utah 1996); Valley
Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert B l d r s , Inc., 944 R2d
361 (Utah 1997); Harper v. Summit County, 963
P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, granted,
982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1999).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. eJur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 46 et
seq, 86; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et
seq, 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237,
280, 389 et seq.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136,
138, 143, 144, 162 et s e q , 173; 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 C.J.S. Pleading
§§ 99 et s e q , 112 to 116, 121 to 129, 264 to 268,
424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to 586.
A.L.R. — Right to voluntary dismissal of civil
action as affected by opponent's motion for
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.

What, other than affidavits, constitutes "matters outside the pleadings," which may convert
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b), (c) into motion for summary judgment, 2
A.L.R. Fed. 1027.
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or
13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as
waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388.
Necessity of oral argument on motion for
summary judgment on pleadings in federal
court, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 755.

Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or
(2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other

Rule 13
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process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under
this Rule 13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim
relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading
of the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with
the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental
pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
(£) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief
in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction
of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be
rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the
opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross demands
have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had
brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up, the
two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, and
neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the
other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an
assignor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire
action and certify the same and transmit all papers therein to the district court
of the county in which such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment by
the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim of the fees ,
required for certifying the record on appeal from such court and for docketing
the same in the district court. The fees herein required to be paid, shall be
deposited with the clerk of the inferior court at the time of filing such
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so to do, the court
may, upon motion of the adverse party, after notice, strike such counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim.
In any action so certified to the district court, when any responsive pleading
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certified as final by the trial court, leaving
issues and parties before that court, will deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction over an
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 R2d 298
(Utah 1991).
Third party by defendant.
—Grounds.
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor
impleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the
defendant in the initial action does so, not on
the ground that a claim for relief then exists
against the third-party defendant, but on the
ground that the third-party defendant "may be
liable" to the defendant in the principal action.
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d
1344 (Utah 1984).
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Untimely motion to allow counterclaim.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying motions to allow a counterclaim and to
bring in third party defendants which were
filed 13 months after an answer to the complaint was filed and two weeks before the
scheduled trial date, where reasons for the
untimely motion were inadequate and where
the parties failed to demonstrate that the
court's denial of the motions resulted in prejudice. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 R2d 794 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc.,
743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 188
et seq.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84.

A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution or
indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20
A.L.R.4th 338.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the
longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so
order, specifying the time therefor.

Rule 56
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Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial,
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only by

1

custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United Sta
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of C
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after t
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or withe
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any pi
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any tin
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in ]
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affida^
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sou|
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, a
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there i
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this r
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked an
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining i
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shal
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controve:
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It sfc
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substanl
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or otl
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the act
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deen
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting i
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth si
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certii
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attacl
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supj
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or furti
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegata
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherw
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there i
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits <
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits tc
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make si
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule

Addendum B

Steve S. Christensen, P.C.
Steve S. Christensen (6156)
Attorney for Defendants
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 322-0591
Facsimile: (801) 322-0592
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRAVELERS/AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY,

AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH WILSON

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEITH WILSON AND TRISHA WILSON,

Civil No. 970903601 CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Affiant, having been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I and my daughter, Trisha Wilson were in a serious automobile accident on July

21, 1996 in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

The accident caused severe injuries to myself and Trisha and the death of our

friend who was driving. I have incurred over $50,000.00 in medical bills from the
accident. Trisha incurred almost $50,000.00 in medical expenses from the injuries she
incurred in the automobile accident.

3.

I have not been able to return to work since the accident

4.

I had purchased Supplementary Uninsured Motorist or SUM coverage when I

purchased an automobile insurance policy from Travelers.
5.

Based on information and belief, the Travelers SUM coverage includes

underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage: The terms and limits for uninsured and
underinsured coverage is the same.
6.

Based on information and belief, subsequent to the issuance of my automobile

insurance policy, Travelers Insurance Company acquired Aetna Insurance Company,
which was the company that originally issued the policy.
7.

Prior to being injured, I was a professional truck driver.

8.

On or about May 1, 1996,1 accepted a job for a Salt Lake City trucking company

in anticipation of my move to Utah.
9.

On May 8, 1996, my family and I had moved out of our home in New York

preparing to move to Utah. After May 8, 1996, we had stayed with my parents.
10.

We had sold our furniture before May 8, 1996 in preparation to move to Utah.

Most of our remaining personal property, other than some small items, had been placed in
a storage unit pending my wife's move to Utah.
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11.

After school closed for the summer, I and my daughter Trisha left my parents'

home in Silver Creek, New York. We returned to New York prior to June 30, 1996 for a
short stay.
12.

Prior to leaving New York on June 30, 1996,1 called my friend in Salt Lake City

to request assistance in locating an apartment in Salt Lake City.
13.

Prior to June 30, 1996,1 called the Granite School District in Salt Lake County,

Utah to request information about enrolling our children in school.
14.

Prior to June 30, 1996,1 told my insurance agency that I had purchased a van so

that I could move my family from New York to Utah.
15.

Prior to June 30, 1996 I substituted our 1993 Plymouth Voyager as the automobile

listed on the insurance policy in place of a 1987 Ford Taurus wagon which was listed
previously.
16.

I told my insurance agency that my family and I were moving to the State of Utah

before I renewed the insurance policy with them.
17.

Based on information and belief, Travelers Insurance Company issued insurance to

drivers both in Utah and in New York at the time of my accident.
18.

Prior to leaving New York on June 30, 1996,1 had requested that my dispatcher

route me through Salt Lake City, UT where I planned to rent an apartment for the family.
I had arranged to stay with friends in Utah upon our arrival there.
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19.

When leaving New York on June 30, 1996, Trisha and I took all of our personal

belongings which we would need during the summer as well as a couple of additional
bags of clothing and miscellaneous items to move to Utah.
20.

When Trisha and I left New York on or about June 30, 1996,1 had no plans to

return to New York. I changed my log book to Utah time and ran my clock by Utah
time.
21.

It was the custom of myself and drivers in the industry in general to keep our log

based on the time of the dispatch center closest to our home.
22.

I had planned to meet my wife later that summer in Gary, Indiana so that I could

help my wife move our possessions from Gary, Indiana to Salt Lake City, Utah by August
15, 1996. I had planned for my father to help my wife and youngest daughter to Gary,
Indiana to meet Trisha and me.
23.

After leaving New York on or about June 30, 1996, Trisha and I traveled to Texas

where we were on the Fourth of July.
24.

On or about July 5, 1996, the renewal of my automobile insurance policy with

Travelers, policy no. 047SG00362069PAHO, became effective until July 5, 1997.
25.

We traveled to Salt Lake City arriving on the evening of July 18, 1996.
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26.

Trisha and I spent approximately two days in Salt Lake County looking for an

apartment. I submitted between two to six rental applications for apartments in Salt Lake
County.
27.

As of July 1996, Trisha and I were present in Salt Lake County, Utah with an

intention to make Salt Lake County our home.
28.

Trisha and I planned to unload a couple of bags of our personal belongings and

leave them with our friend when we were dropped off back at the truck in Salt Lake
County, Utah.
29.

Based on information and belief, the lady who caused the accident was also a

resident of the State of Utah.
30.

Following the accident on July 21, 1996, we settled our claims with other

insurance companies for policy limits in amounts in excess of $25,000.00 each.
31.

Following the accident, we received treatment in Salt Lake City hospitals. I was

released from the hospital on August 4, 1996. I spent a few days staying at the home of a
friend in Salt Lake County and then returned to New York with Trisha to the home of my
parents in early August 1996.
32.

My family was not able to complete their move to Utah when planned. Trisha and

I had to recuperate for approximately three months before we could move.
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33.

My family and I stayed at my parents' home until the first week of November,

1996.
34.

I completed the move of my family to Utah in the first week of November, 1996 as

I had planned to do during August, 1996.
35.

After we completed our move to Utah, I received correspondence and PIP

payments directly from Travelers to my Utah address during 1996.
36.

After we completed our move to Utah, the Travelers' policy continued in effect

without any request from Travelers for an amendment to change the policy to a Utah form
and to adjust the premium.
37.

My family and I are residents of Utah.

38.

My children attend school in Salt Lake County, Utah.
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DATED this

7

day of July 1999.

Keith Wilso
Defend
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ?//

day of July, 1999.

.S^^^
Notary Puli 1C

(seal)
Note-v PutTc"""* " 1
ELFRIEDED. FRIEND .
60 East So-- V p e *1160
Sal* La^eC) 'J-«*£4«11
f/> Con~ s s c E r p res
Fcb'^i-. '5 2C02

State of Utah

I
j

I

^

A

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that an copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH WILSON
was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the

7ffi~~~ day of July 1999 to:

Terry M. Plant
Jason Kerr
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

T^J

Addendum C

Steve S. Christensen, P.C.
Steve S. Christensen (6156)
Attorney for Defendants
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 322-0591
Facsimile: (801) 322-0592
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRAVELERS/AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY,

AFFIDAVIT OF VICKI BANNOR

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEITH WILSON AND TRISHA WILSON,

Civil No. 970903601 CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Affiant, having been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I was employed by Summer Wood Apartments on July 21, 1996. I received an

application from Wilson on or about July 18, 1996.
2.

This application was approved on July 21, 1996. Thereafter, I was informed that

the Wilsons were in a serious automobile accident and would not be able to move in as
planned in August.

3.

However, an apartment had been assigned to the Wilsons in July, 1996. I held this

apartment open for the Wilsons until they arrived in November, 1996.
4.

A copy of the application I received with my hand written notes showing that the

Wilson's were approved is attached as Exhibit *A\
5.

The Wilsons did move into the unit which was held for them at Summerwood

apartments in November, 1996.
DATED rliis 1 ^

day of October 1999.

J^A )jj^

WQ ^ j \ y Y v J b / ^

Vicki Banno^n <;.&•

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this r ^

day of October, 1999.

•&^M&& M£tA
Notary Public

(seal)
NOTARY PUBLIC"

KRISTEN MCCREARY
1333 East 9400 South
Sandy, Utah 64093
CommJttlon Expires
0 ^ May 7, 2001

STATE OF ITTAW
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that an copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ViCKI BANNOR
was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the

[1

Terry M. Plant
Jason Kerr
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Page 3

day of October 1999 to:

A

RENT PER MONTH S

v

StzO

OO

MOVE IN D A T E _ £ ^ i S z 2 k
LEASE PERIOD 15L r*sc>
APARTMENT TYPE A• •
RENT AGENT l

h

^

&r-ticr>**\
• V

SUMMERWOOD COMMUNITY
Apirtment Occupants (List all persons occupying apartment. Separate applications for roommates.)

<te—w->w-»g7A^.Qj,ay

Name of Applicant: •
Birthdate:„

„ ,

J,

_
^

^ oO
Age: .,
y^/

B-3/-43

Spouse's full name Car/vxz
Birthdate::

3-/7-^

List all children;
Name: -r ,

y

7

>

0C*jaM
l ea j j V M a r r j s !
FeTnale
ISepara
Separated
Social Security Number

Age:

Divorced
Single

D7V-tf8'ino

CU i /jfl^
Agc:

J£

Relationship:

^

^'-/•C

, /

Relationship:

cAo ?J) hr

/Temare
Name: . ,

i

Age:

Name:

/

Age:

Residence
.
If you are currently renting: Where X'wCruK
Office Phone #
Present Address: -, t, 1/ «t r-\
City:

3 )j:M S\

Spouse's*

\

1

Relationship:

(F^enjaJt
Male
Female

Relationship:

»v
j / /

H o w Much

State

lh*rcrutState uy

Employment
Company: /QCT\f

irjJ "221

;/

^S3c

City:

Previous Address:

Address:

.,. ,

>*

yX

I*J

..

A/.
$ _ J / £ £ _ _ _ H o w Long

AAA+»*f
Address:

CAauUp/jQ QWorhi.Te)

-%
J-

j
^^f

Zip:

Home#: „„

Landlord #: i

Zip:

Home#:

Landlord #:

Phone:

Position:

How Long: j

DVtnn*Phone:

PneJtion*
Position:

l-2nts# Long:
I nnw
How

sJibttCw eoo-rtt-osHj i^.w

.~

/Q78-W-9S.

frthx + tfl /it, U1-2MO

fatten

A2

*\ 1 .

JU^MJ
0

J/rj

Annual Income: S
Personal References
Name: r- ~ / /
Name:

"l

Pnonc

£ arte 6-q >o
It rftfiU Uih on

*: 71 /

Phone*:

^ o^

->

/w

Relationship:

T

/ ^ SJZ-3696
7u ?W 352f

Relationship:

rr^oJ
/Z»iA*r

Relationship:

Phone #•

Name:

Vehicle Information
Make:

/>/>W/

Model :

Drivers License U:

Color.

Xlj?eV

''JC2~Hfd
Color:

Model:

Year::

/fi^^o^W

Vehicle Plate #

Drivers License M:
Make:

l/o

,

State:

^

93

/

Yean
State:

Vehicle Plate #:

Emergency Contact (nearest relative not living with you)

Name:

Address: *

phone #:

^Relationship:

, .-y^^

\

,av

n-

^

G E N E R AL

AUTHORIZATION

I hereby authorize SUMMERWOOD APARTMENTS to order a credit report and verify all other credit information, including past
and present mortgage and landlord references. It is understood that a photocopy of this document shall also serve as an authorization
to provide the information processing of my Rental application.

Signature of Applicant

Social Security Number^

Signature of Applicant

Social Security Number

